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Adam Smith is revered as the father of modern economics. 
Analysis of his writings, however, reveals a profoundly medieval 
outlook. Smith is preoccupied with the need to preserve order in 
society. His scientiﬁc methodology emphasises reconciliation with 
the world we live in rather than investigation of it. He invokes a 
version of natural law in which the universe is a harmonious 
machine administered by a providential deity. Nobody is uncared 
for and, in real happiness, we are all substantially equal. No action 
is without its appropriate reward – in this life or the next. The social 
desirability of individual self-seeking activity is ensured by the 
“invisible hand,” that is, the hand of a god who has moulded us so 





Karl Marx classed political economists into a “classical” or scientific 
group, on the one hand, with Adam Smith and Ricardo 
representing the pinnacle of this group, and a “vulgar” or 
apologetic group, on the other, comprising, roughly, all the 
mainstream economists after Ricardo (Marx, 1972, p. 501). I want 
to argue here, however, that there is a very significant apologetic 
aspect to Smith, and that this apologetic aspect is intimately 
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concerned with Smith’s conception of the articulation between 
micro and macro levels, between individual actions and social 
consequences. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine Adam Smith’s view that the 
hand of God would invisibly, “by that eternal art which educes 
good from ill” (TMS I.ii.3.4), ensure that uncoordinated individual 
actions would always lead to desirable social consequences, “the 
greatest possible quantity of happiness” (TMS VI.ii.3.1), and to 
show how this is related to his philosophy as a whole. The starting 
point of the paper is that the “invisible hand” concept in Smith is an 
unambiguously theological category. It is by no means a matter of 
making a case for a new and radical reading of Smith: the theological 
interpretation is the first and most obvious meaning to strike the 
reader of what Smith actually wrote. It is the non-theological 
interpretation, the interpretation which says that, in spite of what 
Smith wrote, he actually meant something different, which requires 
demonstration. There is a huge literature on the interpretation of the 
invisible hand in Adam Smith, to review which would require 
another and much longer article, which would not change the 
verdict reached here. It is of course easy to point to specific 
passages in Smith and throw up one’s hands at the ease with 
which he satisfies himself that we are living in the best of all 
possible worlds – and just as easy to dismiss such passages as 
obiter dicta unrelated to his basic theme. Here, for example, is a 
famous passage, the second, in fact, of the three occasions on 
which Smith makes explicit use of the notion of an “invisible hand”: 
 
The rich ... are led by an invisible hand to make nearly the 
same distribution of the necessaries of life, which would have 
been made, had the earth been divided into equal portions 
among all its inhabitants, and thus without intending it, 
without knowing it, advance the interest of the society, and 
afford means to the multiplication of the species. When 
providence divided the earth among a few lordly masters, it 
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neither forgot nor abandoned those who seemed to have 
been left out in the partition. These last too enjoy their share 
of all that it produces. In what constitutes the real happiness 
of human life, they are in no respect inferior to those who 
would seem so much above them. In ease of body and peace 
of mind, all the different ranks of life are nearly upon a level, 
and the beggar, who suns himself by the side of the highway, 
possesses that security which kings are fighting for (TMS 
IV.1.10). 
 
So the poor should be content with their lot – they are just as well 
off as the rich in the things that really matter. Perhaps the typical 
reaction on reading this is to dismiss it as a vulgar aside, a mere 
personal prejudice, having no bearing on Smith’s scientific 
researches. This, however, would be profoundly mistaken. The 
thesis of this paper is that Smith’s whole system of thought can be 
best understood, not as a scientific project aiming at discovery of 
the world, but as a rhetorical one aiming at reconciliation with it – 
indeed, he plainly says as much – and the notion of the ‘invisible 
hand’ lies at the heart of this rhetorical project. 
 
The next section, on The History of Astronomy, argues that in his 
major methodological work, Smith presents a view of science as an 
activity aimed, in the first instance, at reconciling us with the 
world, rather than at theoretically apprehending it. Section 3 
presents Smith’s conception of the world as a harmonious machine 
operated by a providential deity. This conception first arises and is 
presented with great clarity in The Theory of Moral Sentiments; 
and subsequently underlies the social world in The Wealth of 
Nations. Section 4 sets out Smith’s notion of the “invisible hand” as 
an expression of the activity on our behalf of an omniscient, 
omnipotent and benevolent deity. The following section establishes 
the links between Smith and his contemporaries, showing how 
profoundly in tune he was with the Zeitgeist of the second half of 
the eighteenth century. The penultimate section discusses Smith’s 
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failure to deal with some critical contradictions in his system. The 
conclusion notes two possible responses to Smith: that an 
evolutionary mechanism can replace a providential deity as a 
mechanism ensuring that macro optimality corresponds to micro 
rationality; and, alternatively, the recognition that there is no such 
automatic mechanism behoves us to construct one ourselves. 
 
2. Smith’s Methodological Stance 
 
Denis (1999) argued that Smith’s policy prescription was one of 
freedom for capital, freedom for the individual, that is, in so far as 
he is the bearer of property. The present paper argues that Smith 
adopts a providentialist rhetorical strategy to underpin that policy 
prescription. However, not only does Smith attempt to sustain a 
policy recommendation of laissez-faire by invoking a providential 
invisible hand mechanism, but he announces clearly, though in 
general terms beforehand, that this is what he will be doing. For 
Smith, scientific activity has a clear purpose and tendency, namely 
reconciliation to what is. The purpose of this section is to establish 
Smith’s general programme and his conception of science as a 
rhetorical enterprise. 
 
The fragment commonly known as Smith’s “History of Astronomy” 
is more properly called, in full, The Principles which Lead and Direct 
Philosophical Enquiries; Illustrated by the History of Astronomy; by 
the History of the Ancient Physics; and by the History of the Ancient 
Logics and Metaphysics. The full title makes clear that Smith’s 
intention is to set out his conception of scientific method. For Smith, 
in his discussion of successive schools of thought in these Histories, 
the purpose of a system of thought is not to disclose the truth of 
how the world is, but to soothe the imagination, previously agitated 
by wonder at the marvels of the world. 
 
At the level of appearances, Smith says, the world throws up 
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phenomena which appear incoherent and therefore disagreeably 
inflame the imagination with a sense of wonder. The job of a 
science is allay wonder and to soothe the imagination by 
suggesting connections between things, and by tracing the 
unknown back to the familiar, so that the observer may regain his 
tranquillity: 
Philosophy is the science of the connecting principles of 
nature. Nature ... seems to abound with events which 
appear solitary and incoherent ... which therefore disturb the 
easy movement of the imagination. ... Philosophy, by 
representing the invisible chains which bind together all these 
disjointed objects, endeavours to introduce order into this 
chaos of jarring and discordant appearances, to allay this 
tumult of the imagination, and to restore it ... to [its former] 
tone of tranquillity and composure ... Philosophy, therefore, 
may be regarded as one of those arts which address 
themselves to the imagination (Astronomy II.12). 
Again, “the repose and tranquillity of the imagination is the 
ultimate end of philosophy” (Astronomy IV.13); “it is the end of 
Philosophy, to allay that wonder, which either the unusual or 
seemingly disjointed appearances of nature excite” (Astronomy 
IV.33). 
 
Smith, therefore, is not concerned with the truth or otherwise of 
the findings of a science – what matters is its success or otherwise 
in “smoothing the passage of the imagination betwixt . . .  seemingly 
disjointed objects” (Astronomy II.12). It is this criterion alone, he 
says, which we should bear in mind when considering the 
sequence of schools of thought in a science such as astronomy: 
Let us examine, therefore, all the different systems of nature, 
which ... have successively been adopted by the learned and 
ingenious; and, without regarding their absurdity or 
probability, their agreement or inconsistency with truth and 
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reality, let us consider them only in that particular point of 
view which belongs to our subject; and content ourselves 
with inquiring how far each of them was fitted to sooth the 
imagination, and to render the theatre of nature a more 
coherent ... spectacle (Astronomy II.12). 
It is striking that Smith concludes his discussion of Newton’s system 
of astronomy by confessing that it is so compelling that he had, 
despite himself, been seduced into speaking of the latter’s system 
as if it embodied real knowledge of the world: 
even we, while we have been endeavouring to represent all 
philosophical systems as mere inventions of the imagination, 
to connect together the otherwise disjointed and discordant 
phenomena of nature, have insensibly been drawn in, to 
make use of language expressing the connecting principles of 
[Newton’s philosophical system], as if they were the real 
chains which Nature makes use of to bind together her 
several operations (Astronomy IV.76). 
And this is a measure of the success of Newton’s system. The 
implication is, as Raphael and Skinner (1980, pp. 19–21) point out, 
that it would be mistaken, or at best off the point, to regard 
Newton’s connecting principles as “the real chains” of Nature. “It 
may well be said of the Cartesian philosophy,” Smith says, “that in 
the simplicity, precision and perspicuity of its principles and 
conclusions, it had the same superiority over the Peripatetic system, 
which the Newtonian philosophy has over it” (EPS, p. 244). 
 
We need not be surprised ... that the Cartesian philosophy ... 
though it does not perhaps contain a word of truth ... should 
nevertheless have been so universally received by all the 
learned in Europe at that time. The great superiority of 
[Descartes’] method ... made them greedily receive a work 
which we justly esteem one of the most entertaining 
romances that have ever been wrote (cited in EPS, p. 244 
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editorial Note 3). 
 
Although completely untrue, a romance, the principles and 
conclusions of Descartes’ narrative are to be regarded as 
constituting an improvement over previous approaches equal to 
Newton’s, because it provides simple, precise and perspicuous . . .  
entertainment. Descartes’ vortices successfully soothe our 
imagination, and reconcile us to our world, even though “these 
pretended causes of those wonderful effects, not only do not 
actually exist, but are utterly impossible, and if they did exist, could 
produce no such effects as are ascribed to them” (TMS VII.ii.4.14). 
 
For Smith, science starts off, as indeed all science must, with the 
level of appearances: but then, instead of penetrating those 
appearances to reality, the truth, to the essence of the thing, 
science remains at the level of appearances, merely contrasting 
one set of appearances with another. In place of a congeries of 
apparently incoherent, isolated phenomena, Smithian science gives 
us a coherent and interconnected vision of the world. But, for 
Smith, that vision is no more real, no less apparent than either the 
raw appearances or the connecting principles proposed by rival 
explanations. The criterion for choosing between these appearances 
is not their greater or lesser degree of truth, but a purely aesthetic 
consideration: which is the more pleasing? Thus a scientific 
explanation of a phenomenon is to be preferred to none, and a later 
system is preferred to an earlier one, because and to the extent to 
which they are able to provoke greater admiration (Astronomy 
II.12). For example: though much to be preferred to the earlier 
systems, there is no suggestion that the Newtonian system is more 
profound, indeed, it may well be replaced when an even more 
pleasing system is proposed. “Philosophy” is to be traced, he says, 
“from its origin, up to that summit of perfection to which it is at 
present supposed to have arrived [with Newton], and to which, 
indeed, it has equally been supposed to have arrived in almost all 
former times” (Astronomy II.12). In every period, Smith says, science 
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is believed to have reached “the summit of perfection,” since the 
science of that period is just the scientific explanation the period 
finds most pleasing. Whether there is any progress in this is left 
entirely moot. 
 
So is there an objective truth standing behind these appearances, 
these entertaining romances? For Smith, there is indeed objective 
truth, but human, finite minds cannot grasp, or even approach it: 
only the infinite mind of God can grasp all the ultimate “connexions 
and dependencies of things.” Smith adopts the Thomist view of an 
unbridgeable gulf between the finite and the infinite, between the 
human and the divine. This contrast forms the basis for the very 
restricted role of reason and philosophy (the sphere of finitude), 
relative to that of sentiment and religion (the sphere of infinity), in 
Smith’s system. 
 
This section has set out the main lines of Smith’s methodological 
stance and suggested links between his methodology and his 
underlying intellectual goals. Smith’s writings on methodology set 
out a research programme which Smith then followed in his 
psychological (TMS) and economic (WN) investigations. He says in 
advance that the task of science is to allay the discomfort we 
experience from observing the world. In TMS and WN he sets out his 
entertaining romance designed to underpin his political stance. 
 
3. Smith’s Weltanschauung 
 
This section sets out the elements of the “entertaining romance” 
that Smith tells to reconcile us to our world. The universe in this 
story is a machine administered by a deity, with the sole purpose of 
maximising happiness. All parts of that machine, including 
individual people, play their allotted roles. We do what we do 
because it is what we are led to do by the feelings implanted in our 
nature by the deity. Even human folly and weakness are part of 
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God’s plan. Everyone has nearly the same level of happiness and 
we should therefore be content with our lot. The failure to realise 
this, mistaking wealth for happiness, leads people to be 
industrious: the economy depends on their being so deceived. 
Appearances, too, are part of the divine plan. People mistake 
wealth and good fortune for wisdom and virtue. This allows them 
to be reconciled to class distinctions and oppressive rulers. We like 
morality and dislike immorality only because we only see their 
proximate effects on human welfare. This weakness, too, is 
desirable as morality, particularly justice, is a prerequisite for 
society. This underpins an interpretation of the “invisible hand” 
which is set out in the next section. 
 
For Smith the universe is a machine supervised by an omnipotent, 
omniscient and beneficent, deity. The sole aim of the machine is 
the maximisation of happiness: “That divine Being[’s] ... 
benevolence and wisdom have, from all eternity, contrived and 
conducted the immense machine of the universe, so as at all times 
to produce the greatest possible quantity of happiness” (TMS 
VI.ii.3.5. See also TMS VI.ii.3.1). So the world is perfect: we do live 
in the “best of all possible worlds” – Smith is a true Panglossian. 
Since the world is really perfect, our apparent troubles stem from 
our finite, partial view of the world, our failure to see “all the 
connexions and dependencies of things”: 
[Since the] benevolent and all-wise Being can admit into the 
system of his government, no partial evil which is not 
necessary for the universal good, [the wise and virtuous 
man] must consider all the misfortunes which may befal 
himself, his friends, his society, or his country, as necessary 
for the prosperity of the universe, and therefore as what he 
ought, not only to submit to with resignation, but as what he 
himself, if he had known all the connexions and 
dependencies of things, ought sincerely and devoutly to have 
wished for (TMS VI.ii.3.3). 
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For Smith, therefore, what is good is good, and what is bad is good 
as well: everything is for the best, so – whatever happens – rejoice, 
and accept. Though similar ideas can be found in the earlier 
editions, the passages above are taken from Part VI, a new section 
written by Smith, in the last year of his life, for the 1790 edition. 
Hence it cannot be the case that they represent a juvenile stage in 
Smith’s thought long passed by the time he came to write WN. 
 
When Smith argues that what appears bad is actually good, but we 
don’t see it because we are only finite minds, “good” refers only to 
“the good of the whole” (TMS VI.ii.3.4) and says nothing about the 
good of the individual. For the system to seem attractive, Smith 
must show that, not only the total quantity of happiness is 
maximised, but its allocation to individuals is in some sense “fair.” 
Recognising this, Smith says explicitly that all our virtue and vice 
will be appropriately rewarded, if not here, then hereafter. 
 
Firstly, if we look at the lives of individuals as a whole and in the long 
run, then we can in general expect everyone will get their just 
deserts. 
notwithstanding the disorder in which all things appear to be 
in this world, yet even here [i.e., in this world rather than the 
next one] every virtue naturally meets with its proper reward, 
with the recompense which is most fit to encourage and 
promote it; and this too so surely, that it requires a very 
extraordinary concurrence of circumstances entirely to 
disappoint it (TMS III.5.8). 
And if such an “extraordinary concurrence of circumstances” 
should occur, as to frustrate the “natural” process of rewarding 
every virtue in this life, then we may hope for a settling of accounts 
in the next one: “Our happiness in this life is . . .  upon many 
occasions, dependent on the humble hope and expectation of a life 
to come: a hope and expectation deeply rooted in human nature . . .  
a world to come, where exact justice will be done to every man” 
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(TMS III.2.33; see also TMS II.ii.3.12). 
 
Smith combines the idea of justice in the hereafter with that of the 
limits to reason and the scope for religion and sentiment. To those 
such as the wrongly condemned man, Smith says,   
 
humble philosophy which confines its views to this life, can 
afford, perhaps, but little consolation. ... Religion can alone 
afford them any effectual comfort. She alone can tell them, 
that it is of little importance what man may think of their 
conduct, while the all-seeing Judge of the world approves of 
it. She alone can present to them the view of another world 
... where their innocence is in due time to be declared, and 
their virtue to be finally rewarded (TMS III.2.12). 
 
So reason is incompetent to tell us about the really important 
things, such as the afterlife and our “final reward.” Instead we must 
trust religion. Smith’s rhetoric weaves together elements of reason 
and belief, philosophy and religion, to present a seductive world-
view within which he can then embed his policy proposals. 
 
The world is a machine for the production of happiness. But this 
includes not just nature but also human nature. In Smith’s view 
the deity chooses the mental composition of individual persons, 
and hence leads them to desirable behaviours: “[God’s] wisdom . . .  
contrived the system of human affections, as well as that of 
every other part of nature” (TMS VI.ii.2.4). Smith’s argument 
here further illustrates his Panglossian view, firstly, that 
everything is predetermined by the deity, predestined to turn out 
for the best, and, secondly, that if we are misled by appearances, 
then this deception, too, is part of the plan and hence a Good 
Thing. A major instance of the former concerns the predisposition 
to benevolence and the very much stronger one, not just to obey, 
but to enforce, the “sacred laws of justice” (TMS II.ii.2.3), which 
God has placed in our personal make-up, what Smith calls “this 
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constitution of Nature” (TMS II.ii.3 title). Man, he says, “who can 
only subsist in society, was fitted by nature to that situation for 
which he was made” (TMS II.ii.3.1). While it would be nice if 
everyone could cooperate from sheer love of one’s fellows, we can 
still live without society-wide benevolence; but not without justice: 
“Society may subsist, among different men, as among different 
merchants, from a sense of its utility, without any mutual love or 
affection . . .  but the prevalence of injustice must utterly destroy it” 
(TMS II.ii.3.2–3). 
 
Nature has therefore endowed men with consciences in order 
that they may behave justly: 
Though Nature, therefore, exhorts mankind to acts of 
beneficence, by the pleasing consciousness of deserved 
reward, she has not thought it necessary to guard and 
enforce the practice of it by the terrors of merited 
punishment in case it should be neglected. It is the ornament 
which embellishes, not the foundation which supports the 
building, and which it was, therefore, sufficient to 
recommend, but by no means necessary to impose. Justice, 
on the contrary, is the main pillar that upholds the whole 
edifice. If it is removed, the great, the immense fabric of 
human society, that fabric which to raise and support seems 
in this world ... to have been the peculiar and darling care of 
Nature, must in a moment crumble into atoms. In order to 
enforce the observation of justice, therefore, Nature has 
implanted in the human breast that consciousness of ill-
desert, those terrors of merited punishment which attend 
upon its violation, as the great safe-guards of the association 
of mankind, to protect the weak, to curb the violent, and to 




It is clear that Smith is saying here that Nature, in order to preserve 
society, has placed in our personalities a desire for justice, even if it 
is unclear whether this is based on a love of justice for its own 
sake, or a fear of retribution. A sense of justice is an endowment of 
nature, but nature seen as an active force in the world, conscious 
and intentional. 
 
Despite Smith’s claim that justice is fundamental for society, order 
is in reality of more basic importance to him. If there is any tension 
between the two, it is order which comes first. Speaking of the 
tendency for members of the different “orders and societies” in the 
state to resist any diminution in their “powers, privileges and 
immunities,” he argues that: 
 
This partiality, though it may sometimes be unjust, may not, 
upon that account be useless. It checks the spirit of 
innovation. It tends to preserve whatever is the established 
balance among the different orders and societies into which 
the state is divided; and while it sometimes appears to 
obstruct some alterations in government which may be 
fashionable and popular at the time, it contributes in reality 
to the stability and permanency of the whole system (TMS 
VI.ii.2.10). 
 
The assumption is that what is, is likely to be best, and should in 
general be preserved, even at the expense of justice. Having said 
that, however, we should note that, for Smith, just as there can be no 
profound antagonism between investigation and reconciliation, 
there cannot be any serious conflict between order and justice. 
Indeed, as we saw above, everyone always gets their just deserts in 
the end, either later in this life or, should that fail, in the next one. 
It is precisely this concept of an automatic mechanism rationally 





principles, such as the partiality of the orders of society in defence 
of their own interests, and the contempt “unjustly” bestowed upon 
poverty and weakness instead of on vice and folly (TMS II.ii.3.4), 
when they conflict with the claims of justice. 
 
So when Smith speaks of justice he is actually thinking of social 
order – but when he talks of order he is thinking of property. This is 
nowhere clear than in his discussion about theft by the poor from 
the rich: 
 
The poor man must neither defraud nor steal from the rich, 
though the acquisition might be much more beneficial to the 
one than the loss could be hurtful to the other ... by [doing 
so] he renders himself the proper object of the contempt 
and indignation of mankind; as well as of the punishment 
which that contempt and indignation must naturally dispose 
them to inflict, for having thus violated one of those sacred 
rules, upon the tolerable observation of which depend the 
whole security and peace of human society. There is no 
commonly honest man who does not more dread the inward 
disgrace of such an action, the indelible stain which it would 
for ever stamp upon his own mind, than the greatest external 
calamity which, without any fault of his own, could possibly 
befal him; and who does not inwardly feel [that such an 
action] is more contrary to nature, than death, than poverty, 
than pain, than all the misfortunes which can affect him (TMS 
III.3.6). 
 
Thus theft by the poor from the rich even when, as he concedes, it 
would augment social welfare calls down more Smithian abuse 
upon their heads than any other crime. In one passage a murderer 
or parricide, by contrast, is dismissed as merely “ungrateful” (TMS 
II.ii.3.11), while in another, murder, though stigmatised as “this most 
dreadful of all crimes” (TMS II.i.2.5), is dealt with matter-of-factly 
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without any of the excitement shown in his discussion of theft 
from the rich. Again, it is well known that Smith regarded the state 
as an institution guarding the rich from the poor: 
Till there be property there can be no government, the very 
end of which is to secure wealth, and to defend the rich from 
the poor (Smith Lectures on Jurisprudence, cited in WN 
V.i.b.12 n21). Civil government, so far as it is instituted for the 
security of property, is in reality instituted for the defence of 
the rich against the poor, or of those who have some 
property against those who have none at all (WN V.i.b.12). 
This fact, however, has been subjected to the almost comical 
misinterpretation that somehow this represented a complaint, a 
plea on behalf of the underdog. Viner (1958, p. 233), for example, 
cites these passages as evidence for Smith’s desire to limit 
government activity, and Raphael (1985, p. 8) says that the WN 
passage strikes a “radical note.” Nothing could be further from the 
truth. The context of these passages shows unambiguously that 
Smith was simply, and, in his view, uncontroversially, setting out 
how things were and how they should be: 
The affluence of the rich excites the indignation of the poor, 
who are ... prompted by envy to invade his possessions ... 
which [are] acquired by the labour of many years, or perhaps 
of many successive generations ... He is at all times 
surrounded by unknown enemies, whom, though he never 
provoked, he can never appease, and from whose injustice he 
can be protected only by the powerful arm of the civil 
magistrate continually held up to chastise [the injustice of 
those enemies]. The acquisition of valuable and extensive 
property, therefore, necessarily requires the establishment 
of civil government (WN: V.i.b.2). 
What these passages reveal is that at the heart of Smith’s system is 
the privacy of property. He is concerned above all to preserve 
private property – whether from the disorganised action of the 
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poor, or the organised intervention of the state. In all these cases, 
our social behaviour is sustained by features of our personalities 
inculcated by a by the deity, by “Nature.” 
 
Our strengths are thus implanted in us by divine providence. Not 
only our strengths but our weaknesses, too, however, are endowed 
by nature. A particularly striking example concerns the tendency of 
a fickle public to admire people merely for being lucky: 
Fortune has ... great influence over the moral sentiments of 
mankind, and, according as she is either favourable or 
adverse, can render the same character the object, either of 
general love and admiration, or of universal hatred and 
contempt. This great disorder in our moral sentiments is by 
no means, however, without its utility; and we may on this 
as well as on many other occasions, admire the wisdom of 
God even in the weakness and folly of man. Our admiration 
of success is founded upon the same principle with our 
respect for wealth and greatness, and is equally necessary 
for establishing the distinction of ranks and the order of 
society. By this admiration of success we are taught to submit 
more easily to those superiors, whom the course of human 
affairs may assign to us; to regard with reverence, and 
sometimes even with a sort of respectful affection, that 
fortunate violence which we are no longer capable of 
resisting; not only the violence of such splendid characters as 
those of a Caesar or an Alexander, but often that of the most 
brutal and savage barbarians, of an Attila, a Gengis, or a 
Tamerlane (TMS VI.iii.30). 
 
This is a remarkable passage. Admiration for the merely lucky is, 
admittedly, a “great disorder” in our morals. But even our folly 
reflects God’s wisdom, and this particular folly, like everything else, 
has been given us by God for a reason. The good thing about this 
weakness is that it reconciles us with our rulers, even those who 
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only achieved this status by means of “fortunate violence,” inspiring 
us even to a kind of affection for brutal tyrants such as Tamerlane, 
who reputedly made mountains of his enemies’ skulls. 
 
As Smith reminds us, this view of the role of fortune in moral 
sentiments parallels that of public admiration of the great in 
preference to the good: 
 
This disposition to admire, and almost to worship, the rich 
and the powerful, and to despise, or, at least, to neglect 
persons of poor and mean condition ... is ... the great and 
most universal cause of the corruption of our moral 
sentiments. That wealth and greatness are often regarded 
with the respect and admiration which are due only to 
wisdom and virtue; and that the contempt, of which vice and 
folly are the only proper objects, is often most unjustly 
bestowed upon poverty and weakness, has been the 
complaint of moralists in all ages (TMS I.iii.3.1). 
 
And the moralists were wrong – in Smith’s view – since, as we have 
seen, even injustice can be part of a higher Good. Even this 
“universal cause of moral corruption,” however, is god-given and 
has its purpose: it is “necessary both to establish and maintain the 
distinction of ranks and the order of society” (TMS I.iii.3.1): 
 
The distinction of ranks, the peace and order of society, are, 
in a great measure, founded upon the respect which we 
naturally conceive for [the greatly fortunate ... the rich and 
powerful]. ... The peace and order of society is of more 
importance than even the relief of the miserable. ... 
Moralists ... warn us against the fascination of greatness. 
This fascination, indeed, is so powerful, that the rich and the 
great are too often preferred to the wise and the virtuous. 
Nature has wisely judged that the distinction of ranks, the 
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peace and order of society would rest more securely upon 
the plain and palpable difference of birth and fortune, than 
upon the invisible and often uncertain difference of wisdom 
and virtue. The undistinguishing eyes of the great mob of 
mankind can well enough perceive the former: it is with 
difficulty that the nice discernment of the wise and the 
virtuous can sometimes distinguish the latter. In the order of 
all those recommendations, the benevolent wisdom of 
nature is equally evident (TMS VI.ii.1.20). 
 
So even this particular weakness, which Smith has earlier damned 
in the most severe terms, is evidence of the “benevolent wisdom of 
nature,” and it is so because there has to be a ruling stratum, and 
Nature has judged it best to have an obvious one to which the 
masses can easily be led to give their loyalty. 
 
This leads us to a very important point concerning the admiration 
of wealth, and the “deception of nature” which, again, illustrates 
Smith’s view that deceptive appearances can still be desirable. For 
Smith, the outward appearance of great disparity in wealth 
between the rich and the poor conceals a very large measure of real 
equality in welfare. In TMS, he says of the poor that: 
These last too enjoy their share of all that it produces. In what 
constitutes the real happiness of human life, they are in no 
respect inferior to those who would seem so much above 
them. In ease of body and peace of mind, all the different 
ranks of life are nearly upon a level, and the beggar, who 
suns himself by the side of the highway, possesses that 
security which kings are fighting for (TMS IV.1.10). 
So the poor should be content with their lot – they are just as well 
off as the rich in the things that really matter. The sources of real 
happiness were divided by divine providence – or by the rich who 
are, in turn, led by divine providence – so that we all get an equal 
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share. This theme is repeated throughout Smith’s works, often 
combined with the notion that great happiness and grief are 
occasioned not by a state or condition but by a change in 
condition. Smith draws the conclusion that much of the evil in life 
can be attributed to failure to understand that all permanent 
conditions are alike, and that it is only changes which matter: 
The great source of both the misery and disorders of human 
life, seems to arise from over-rating the difference between 
one permanent situation and another. Avarice over-rates the 
difference between poverty and riches. ... The person under 
the influence of [avarice], is not only miserable in his actual 
situation, but is often disposed to disturb the peace of society, 
in order to arrive at that which he so foolishly admires ... 
[although] in all the ordinary situations of human life, a well- 
disposed mind may be equally ... contented. ... In all the most 
glittering and exalted situation that our idle fancy can hold 
out to us, the pleasures from which we derive our happiness, 
are almost the same with those which, in our actual, though 
humble station, we have at all times at hand, and in our 
power (TMS III.3.31). 
But in even this cloud there is a silver lining! To be deceived by 
appearances is often desirable: 
The poor man’s son, whom heaven in its anger has visited 
with ambition ... admires the condition of the rich. ... He is 
enchanted with the distant idea of this felicity ... and, in 
order to arrive at it, he devotes himself for ever to the 
pursuit of wealth and greatness. ... Through the whole of his 
life he pursues the idea of a certain artificial and elegant 
repose which he may never arrive at, for which he sacrifices a 
real tranquillity, that is at all times in his power, and which, if 
in the extremity of old age he should at last attain to it, he 
will find to be in no respect preferable to that humble 
security and contentment which he had abandoned for it. It 
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is then ... that he begins at last to find that wealth and 
greatness are mere trinkets of frivolous utility. ... And it is 
well that nature imposes upon us in this manner. It is this 
deception which rouses and keeps in motion the industry of 
mankind (TMS IV.1.8–10). 
 
This “deception by nature” (Raphael & Macfie, 1976, p. 8), which 
leads people to fulfil what they think are their own purposes, only 
to find they were fulfilling the purposes of a superior force or 
interest, is the counterpart in Smith of the “cunning of reason” in 
Hegel,1 and the “divine tactic” of history in Burke (Sabine, 1951, p. 
519), both whom are known to have read and admired Smith.2 
 
The deception of nature is not ancillary but fundamental to Smith’s 
principal doctrine. This becomes clear in the first few pages of TMS 
(I.i.1.1–13), where we find that, according to Smith, the whole 
structure of moral sentiments is built on illusion. The basis for 
morality is sympathy, that is, our ability to a limited extent to enter 
into the emotions of other people. But this participation in the 
pains and pleasures of others is achieved solely by an act of the 
imagination, divorced from the material causes of those pains and 
pleasures in the person we sympathise with. This sympathy even 
extends to fictional characters and the dead people, that is, who 
are themselves incapable of feeling pain and pleasure. This shows 
sympathy to be a “very illusion of the imagination” (TMS I.i.1.13), 
the imagination of “what perhaps is impossible” (TMS I.i.1.11). We 
place ourselves, in the imagination, in the position of the other 
person, without in fact being in that position, and often without it 
being possible that we ever could be in such a position. We cannot 
help it: it is a god-given compulsion from which even the most 
hardened criminal is not exempt (TMS I.i.1.1). 
 
Smith’s God treats individual humans in an extremely cavalier 
manner, subjecting them to all sorts of illusions and deceptions, 
and other weaknesses and indignities, and in general treating them 
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like puppets, often with quite deleterious consequences to the 
individual in question, supposedly in the interest of maximising 
human welfare. A classic case of this occurs at the end of the first 
chapter of TMS, where he applauds even the fear of death as bad at 
the individual but good at the social level: “one of the most 
important principles in human nature [is] the dread of death, the 
great poison to the happiness, but the great restraint upon the 
injustice of mankind, which, while it afflicts and mortifies the 
individual, guards and protects the society” (TMS I.i.1.13). 
 
In connection with this we should perhaps recall the value which 
Smith really placed on the individual in the context of the overall 
system of which he is part. Before his God, says Smith, man 
appears as a “vile insect” (TMS II.ii.3.12).3 Again, in The History of 
the Ancient Physics he describes “a God of all . . .  who governs the 
whole by general laws, directed to the conservation and prosperity 
of the whole, without regard to [the conservation and prosperity] 
of any private individual” (Astronomy: Physics 9). 
 
So Smith’s God teaches us that it is permissible to “poison the 
happiness,” to “afflict and mortify the individual,” to disregard “the 
conservation and prosperity . . .  of any private individual” – in the 
interest of society, of “the whole”; and if we are to consider the 
individual a “vile insect” relative to the totality of which he is part, 
we will certainly be unrestrained by respect for individual lives and 
individual suffering in pursuit of what we take to be the interest of 
that totality. Smith’s love of “the ennobling hardships and hazards 
of war” (TMS III.2.35) is germane here: “War is the great school for 
acquiring and exercising . . .  magnanimity.” It teaches a “habitual 
contempt of danger and death” which “ennobles the profession of 
a soldier, and bestows upon it . . .  a rank and dignity superior to that 
of any other profession” (TMS VI.iii.7). Indeed, a “great warlike 
exploit” attracts a measure of “esteem” just because it is military, 
even “though undertaken contrary to every principle of justice” 
and by “very worthless characters” (TMS VI.iii.8). Passages showing 
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a quite militaristic outlook on society (TMS VI.ii.3–4), passages 
introduced in the 6th edition of TMS at the end of Smith’s life, have 
already been cited above. When twentieth and twenty-first century 
individualists and “libertarians” claim intellectual descent from 
Smith, one wonders whether they have read him. 
 
The message of this section is thus that, according to Smith, people 
do things for apparent reasons – the real reasons being often 
hidden from them, and it is desirable that they should do so. They 
act justly from a sense of justice, but the reason why a desire for 
justice has been given us in this way is so that society may subsist; 
we admire the rich, the fortunate and the powerful, instead of the 
wise and virtuous, because it is in our nature to do so, but those 
feelings have been implanted in us to reconcile us to our lot; we 
mistake wealth for happiness, and are led to do so, so that trade 
and industry may flourish; we investigate the world thinking to 
discover its truth, so that by means of ever more pleasing stories 
about the world we may be reconciled to it. 
 
In the next section we will see how these ideas relate to Smith’s 
notion of an “invisible hand.” 
 
4. The Invisible Hand 
 
Smith uses the term “the invisible hand” on three occasions. On the 
first occasion, in Astronomy, he refers to “the invisible hand of 
Jupiter.” There is a contrast between the role of the invisible hand 
here, on the one hand, and in TMS and WN, on the other: the 
action of the former is seen only in “the irregular events of nature” 
rather than the “ordinary course of things” (Astronomy III.2). In 




it is the irregular events of nature only that are ascribed to 
the agency and power of their gods. Fire burns, and water 
refreshes ... by the necessity of their own nature; nor was 
the invisible hand of Jupiter ever apprehended to be 
employed in those matters. But ... irregular events were 
ascribed to his favour or his anger. ... Those ... intelligent 
beings, whom they imagined, but knew not, were naturally 
supposed ... not to employ themselves in supporting the 
ordinary course of things, which went on of its own accord, 
but to stop, to thwart, and to disturb it (Astronomy III.2). 
 
Smith says that this was because humans acted in this way to 
change the course of events which would have occurred without 
human intervention and so primitive peoples supposed that their 
gods acted likewise. This, says Smith, is “the lowest and most 
pusillanimous superstition” (Astronomy III.2). Smith contrasts this 
view of gods, like men, as responsible for only the exceptional, 
with his own view of the whole world, including societies and 
individuals within it, as a great machine designed and managed for 
the best interest of all by a divine administrator: 
 
In the first ages of the world, the seeming incoherence of the 
appearances of nature, so confounded mankind, that they 
despaired of discovering in her operations any regular 
system. Their ignorance, and confusion of thought, 
necessarily gave birth to that pusillanimous superstition, 
which ascribes almost every unexpected event, to the 
arbitrary will of some designing, though invisible beings, who 
produced it for some private and particular purpose. The 
idea of an universal mind, of a God of all, who originally 
formed the whole, and who governs the whole by general 
laws, directed to the conservation and prosperity of the 
whole, without regard to that of any private individual, was a 
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notion to which they were utterly strangers (Astronomy: 
Physics 9). 
 
So, firstly, not only the irregular, but, and much more importantly, 
the most regular occurrences are the work of the deity; and, 
secondly, human actions, too, far from being contrary to nature, 
are profoundly in harmony with it. Natural events and human 
actions alike and without exception are part of the divine plan: 
“Instead of acting capriciously, [the invisible hand] becomes [the 
hand of] the ‘all-wise Architect and Conductor,’ the ‘author of 
nature,’ who governs and animates ‘the whole machine of the 
world’ ” (Macfie, 1971, p. 598). 
 
In contrast to that in the Astronomy, Smith’s use of the expression 
in TMS and WN is in a context where Smith is presenting his own 
views, not criticising someone else’s. The second instance of 
Smith’s use of the term “invisible hand,” in TMS, has already been 
given at the beginning of this paper. In WN he says: 
By preferring the support of domestick to that of foreign 
industry, [every individual]4 intends only his own security; 
and by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce 
may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, 
and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible 
hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. 
Nor is it always the worse for society that it was no part of it. 
By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of 
the society more effectually than when he really intends to 
promote it (WN IV.ii.9). 
In both cases he claims that the invisible hand will ensure that 
the unintended outcome of self-seeking behaviour will be 
socially desirable. Without it, in the TMS case, individuals would 
be subject to large differences in welfare; and in the WN case, 





It should by now be clear that the use of the phrase “an invisible 
hand” is just another expression of Smith’s deist philosophy. The 
machine of the universe is managed by a deity determined on the 
maximisation of happiness, and our emotions and motives are 
predetermined by that deity to lead us to behave in a manner 
consonant with the divine plan. The administration of the plan is 
carried out by God – but, of course, we cannot see anything: his 
hands are invisible5. Hence the concept of the invisible hand 
requires no separate treatment. We have already seen how agents 
are “deceived by nature” to act in socially desirable ways, how the 
unintended consequences of our desire for justice, or riches, make 
society possible. The notion of an invisible hand is of a piece with 
this philosophy. 
 
The fallacious view that the “invisible hand” is not to be taken 
literally, but was a metaphor (or even simile), for competition, is 
extremely widespread. Arguments that Smith’s invisible hand is 
“the hand of competition” are not to the point. Of course this is 
true: Smith’s whole argument is that God’s wisdom works itself out 
through spontaneous processes, such as competition, through the 
“simple system of natural liberty,” as well as in other ways, such as 
our desire for the approbation of the “impartial spectator.” But the 
notion of competition by no means exhausts the notion of the 
invisible hand, to which it is wholly subordinate. 
 
A much earlier version of this paper followed conventional usage in 
referring to a metaphor of “the invisible hand.” I now think this 
mistaken. Smith was very consistent in flagging any such comparison 
by the use of simile instead of metaphor. In my opinion, Smith 
intended us to read his statements in WN and TMS of agents being 
“led by an invisible hand” quite literally: the invisible hand leading 
them is just the hand of God. Had he desired another interpretation 
he would have written “led as” or “as if,” or “as though by an 
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invisible hand.” It is interesting that Smith is frequently misquoted, 
with the words “as” or “as if” inserted into the passage in WN in 
question in an unconscious misrepresentation as simile of what 
Smith saw only as literal truth. I have found extraordinary 
resistance to the idea that he did not say that. 
 
The central claim of this paper, therefore, is that the invisible hand 
concept in Smith was entirely and unambiguously theological. There 
is no question of setting out a case for a new and radical 
reinterpretation of Smith’s meaning: the theological interpretation 
is the first and most obvious meaning to strike the reader of what 
Smith actually wrote. It is the non-theological interpretation, the 
interpretation which says that, in spite of what Smith wrote, he 
actually meant something different, which requires 
demonstration. What is remarkable is the regularity with which 
those writers who wish to separate the invisible hand from the 
universal mind which guides it simply resort to assertion without 
setting out the case for the their alternative interpretation. 
 
The other tactic frequently employed is to counterpose divine 
intervention with spontaneous process such as the market forces 
of supply and demand. But that is not the question. There is no 
debate over whether these supposedly socially desirable outcomes 
are achieved by these spontaneous forces in Smith. God, in Smith, 
does not intervene directly, unmediatedly, in human affairs. We do 
not know what Smith did or did not privately believe – very likely he 
shared his friend, David Hume’s, well known rejection of miracles. 
If there are miracles then any intellectual project is at an end since 
the world is irregular and arbitrary. Certainly the public Smith of the 
Astronomy, TMS and WN shows no evidence whatsoever of belief in 
such miraculous direct intervention. What he does very clearly 
show is a belief that human happiness is the distal, not proximal, 
consequence of God’s will, mediated by the totality of natural and 
social phenomena. The latter, including the “simple system of 




the indirect manifestations of God’s will, and instruments for the 
working out of God’s purposes. Competition is able to act as an 
equilibrating mechanism in Adam Smith, solely because the 
individual interests which it has to balance have already been pre-
reconciled by a kindly Great Administrator of the system of the 
universe. 
 
It is the case that the expression “an invisible hand” only appears 
once in WN, and the deistic explanation of it does not appear at all. 
A great deal of empirical material, however, does appear, and, 
while the overwhelming bulk of that material is directed towards 
showing the superiority of the laissez faire system, he does 
indicate exceptions to its desirability. It is easy to see how modern, 
nineteenth and twentieth century readers of WN in isolation from 
Smith’s other works and from those of his contemporaries, should 
assume that this was a predominantly empirical study drawing the 
conclusion that in general, free competition was a good thing. It is 
easy to overlook the fact that the empirical material only plays the 
role of illustrating a preconceived order. Smith does not in fact 
anywhere make the inductive judgement that, as a generalisation, 
individual self-seeking behaviour leads automatically to socially 
desirable outcomes on the contrary, this is assumed beforehand 
and illustrated by details of many empirical circumstances where it 
is asserted, over and over again, that this has occurred, or would 
occur if only enterprise were free. It is only by exploring the totality 
of Smith’s thought, not only in the WN but in TMS and Astronomy 
as well, that we can clearly see the a priori and deductive nature of 
Smith’s procedure, the assumption that the spontaneous system of 
free enterprise will lead to desirable outcomes because, in general, 
agents’ interests are pre-reconciled by the invisible hand of a 
providential deity. Whatever the stylistic and presentational 
differences between TMS and WN, this invocation of faith remains 





Adam Smith’s starting point was a belief in a benign, omniscient and 
omnipotent deity. It is hard, perhaps, for us to see it now, but that 
was the standard view in Smith’s time, that was the default, that 
was part of what Becker (see below) calls the medieval “climate of 
opinion” which characterised eighteenth century thought. To have 
argued anything else would have been both more remarkable, and 
more difficult. It is not that Smith chose a theological approach, but 
that he accepted one as the common coin of the time – why 
should he not, since it was perfectly consistent with his rhetorical 
strategy and it meant he was speaking the same language as his 
audience. 
 
The phrase “an invisible hand” occurs throughout nineteenth 
century literature – in Mary Shelley (1818) Frankenstein Ch. XII, 
Thomas Hardy (1874) Far From the Madding Crowd Ch. 42, and in H. 
G. Wells (1898) The War of the Worlds Ch. 6, to give just three 
examples – in each case in utterly pedestrian contexts. Raphael 
(1985, p. 67) gives an instance of its use in the early eighteenth 
century, when a captain wrote in his log that the ship had been 
saved from sinking by “the invisible hand of Providence.” That the 
idea of the guiding hand of an unseen god, ensuring the desirable 
social consequences of self-seeking behaviour – without the phrase 
of the “invisible hand” itself, however – was a commonplace of late 
eighteenth century social commentary is shown by Hayek by 
reference to Smith, Tucker, Ferguson and Edmund Burke (Hayek, 
1948, p. 7). Taking the latter, writing in 1795 as an example: “The 
benign and wise disposer of all things . . .  obliges men, whether they 
will it or not, in pursuing their own selfish interests, to connect the 
general good with their own individual success” (Burke cited in 
Hayek, 1948, p. 7). 
 
Smith’s biographer, Dugald Stewart, emphatically shares this 
standpoint, consciously echoing Smith’s pronouncements by 
referring explicitly to the invisible hand. The motivations of each 




act in subserviency to [nature’s] designs, and ... conduct him 
... to certain beneficial arrangements ... he is led by an 
invisible hand, and contributes his share to the execution of 
a plan, of the nature and advantages of which he has no 
conception (cited in Poovey, p. 274). A firm conviction that 
the general laws of the moral, as well as of the material 
world, are wisely and beneficently ordered for the welfare of 
our species, inspires the pleasing and animating persuasion, 
that by studying these laws, and accommodating to them our 
political institutions, we may ... [consider] ourselves ... as 
fellow-workers with God in forwarding the gracious purposes 
of his government. It represents to us the order of society as 
much more the result of Divine than of human wisdom (cited 
in Poovey, p. 277). 
 
Let Stewart’s words stand as a conclusion to this section. The 
next section looks in more detail at the relationship between 
Smith and his contemporaries. 
 
5. Smith’s Intellectual Environment6 
5.1. The “Heavenly City” of the 18th Century Philosophes 
 
All are but parts of one 
stupendous whole,  
Whose body nature is, and 
God the soul; 
...  
All discord, harmony 
not understood;  
All partial evil, 
universal good: 
And, in spite of pride, in 
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erring reason’s spite,  
One truth is clear, Whatever 
is, is right. (Alexander Pope, 
cited in Becker, 1932, p. 
66).7 
 
Adam Smith was very much a man of his time. Smith’s “modified 
Stoicism typical of Cicero” was “almost conventional in the 
Enlightenment” (Macfie, 1959, p. 210). This is a theme which is 
taken up at length in Carl Becker’s The Heavenly City of the 
Eighteenth-Century Philosophers (Becker, 1932), in which, 
especially in Ch II “The Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God” 
(Becker, 1932, pp. 33–70), he makes a powerful case that the 
intellectuals of this period8 were not in any meaningful sense 
“modern,” but that, on the contrary, they were living in a 
medieval world and “demolished the Heavenly City of St 
Augustine only to rebuild it with more up-to-date materials” 
(Becker, 1932, p. 31): 
We are accustomed to think of the eighteenth century as 
essentially modern in its temper. ... And yet I think the 
Philosophes were nearer the Middle Ages, less emancipated 
from the preconceptions of medieval Christian thought, than 
they quite realized or we have commonly supposed. ... 
[T]hey speak a familiar language. ... But I think our 
appreciation is of the surface more than of the fundamentals. 
... [I]f we examine the foundations of their faith, we find that 
at every turn the Philosophes betray their debt to medieval 
thought without being aware of it. ... They had put off the 
fear of God, but maintained a respectful attitude towards the 
Deity. They ridiculed the idea that the universe had been 
created in six days, but still believed it to be a beautifully 
articulated machine designed by the Supreme Being 
according to a rational plan as an abiding place for mankind 
... they renounced the authority of church and Bible, but 
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exhibited a naïve faith in the authority of nature and reason. ... 
[T]he underlying preconceptions of eighteenth century 
thought were still ... essentially the same as those of the 
thirteenth century (Becker, 1932, pp. 29–31). 
On the overall aim of the philosophers, he cites Hume – with whom 
Smith shared a mutual admiration and close friendship – as an 
example, “Hume is representative of his century” (Becker, 1932, p. 
39). Like Smith, Hume was sufficiently concerned with preservation 
of the social order to be willing to lay down his pen in its service. In 
his own words: 
I am at present castrating my work ... that is, endeavouring 
it shall give as little offence as possible (cited in Becker, 1932, 
p. 38). A man has but a bad grace who delivers a theory, 
however true, which leads to a practice dangerous and 
pernicious. Why rake into those corners of nature, which 
spread a nuisance all around? ... Truths which are pernicious 
to society ... will yield to errors, which are salutary and 
advantageous ... (ibid). 
Here, as in Smith, we find the idea that error can be 
“advantageous.” Following through the programme just 
mentioned, 
in mid-career Hume abandoned philosophical speculations 
for other subjects, such as history and ethics, which could be 
treated honestly without giving ‘offense’ (Becker, 1932, pp. 
38–39). These are, no doubt, the reasons why Hume locked 
his Dialogues away in his desk ... his contemporaries, could 
they have looked into that locked desk, would have found ... 
the brilliant argument that demolished the foundations of 
natural religion. ... Hume ... refused to publish his Dialogues, 
and never, in public at least, failed to exhibit a punctiliously 
correct attitude toward the Author of the Universe (Becker, 
1932, p. 78). 
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It is well known that Adam Smith was a close friend of Hume’s and 
admired his work enormously. He described Hume as the nearest 
possible to “a perfectly wise and virtuous man” (TMS: Appendix II, 
p. 383). Hume’s words are in perfect agreement with Smith’s 
project of prioritising reconciliation over investigation. 
 
In Becker’s view, the Philosophes faced 
the ugly dilemma, emerging from the beautiful premises of 
the new philosophy: if nature is good, then there is no evil in 
the world; if there is evil in the world, then nature is so far 
not good. ... Will they, closing their eyes to the brute facts, 
maintain that there is no evil in the world? In that case there 
is nothing for them to set right. Or will they, keeping their 
eyes open, admit that there is evil in the world? (Becker, 
1932, p. 69). 
The philosophers were at a crossroads: reason pointed forwards, 
to atheism and to the project of rebuilding a haphazard, 
spontaneous and irrational society in the image of the order they 
had previously ascribed to nature; the alternative was the denial of 
reason and a return to medieval Christian faith. Open-eyed, they 
could adopt an empirical, materialist standpoint, recognising the 
need to take control of, and responsibility for, spontaneous human 
institutions; or with eyes closed they could take an a priori stance, 
imposing on the world a scheme derived from religious belief. 
“Well, we know what the Philosophers did in this emergency. They 
found . . .  that reason is amenable to treatment. They therefore 
tempered reason with sentiment .. .” (Becker, 1932, p. 69). 
“Sometime about 1750, men of sense became men of sentiment…” 
(Becker, 1932, p. 41). 
 
None of this was written with Smith specifically to the forefront of 
Becker’s mind – but the description fits like a glove. Smith is the 
epitome of this intellectual retreat of the enlightenment in the late 
eighteenth century, the retreat from rationalism to romanticism. In 
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every respect, reason is belittled and sentiment and religion brought 
to the fore. At best, for Smith, reason only confirms what we know 
anyway by means of sentiment and religion: 
 
This reverence [for general rules] is still further enhanced by 
an opinion which is first impressed by nature, and afterwards 
confirmed by reasoning and philosophy, that those 
important rules of morality are the commands and laws of 
the Deity, who will finally reward the obedient, and punish 
the transgressors of their duty. ... [R]eligion ... gave a 
sanction to the rules of morality, long before the age of 
artificial reasoning and philosophy. That the terrors of religion 
should thus enforce the natural sense of duty, was of too 
much importance to the happiness of mankind, for nature to 
leave it dependent on the slowness and uncertainty of 
philosophical researches. These researches, however, when 
they came to take place, confirmed those original 
anticipations of nature. (TMS II.5.3). 
 
Reasoning, for Smith, is artificial, and only sentiment is natural: 
 
That the Deity loves virtue and hates vice ... for the effects 
which they tend to produce ... is not the doctrine of nature, 
but of an artificial, though ingenious, refinement of 
philosophy. All our natural sentiments prompt us to believe 
[the opposite] ... (TMS: 91 note, editions 1 and 2). 
 
For Smith reason is “the abstruse syllogisms of a quibbling 
dialectic,” and sentiment, “the great discipline which Nature has 
established” (TMS III.3.21). 
 
The medieval view of the world, and the role of reason within it – 
the view of the world to which Smith and his contemporaries 




Existence was ... regarded by the medieval man as a cosmic 
drama, composed by the master dramatist according to a 
central theme and on a rational plan. Finished in idea before 
it was enacted in fact ... the drama was unalterable either 
for good or evil ... the duty of man was to accept the drama 
as written, since he could not alter it; his function, to play 
the role assigned. ... Intelligence was essential, since God had 
endowed men with it. But the function of intelligence was 
strictly limited. ... The function of intelligence was therefore 
to demonstrate the truth of revealed knowledge, to reconcile 
diverse and pragmatic experience with the rational pattern of 
the world as given in faith (Becker, 1932, p. 7). 
 
Smith, therefore, was in many ways typical of the philosophers of 
the period, on Becker’s interpretation of the eighteenth century. 
Like Hume, who was a major influence on his philosophy, Smith 
regarded the preservation of the social order as of primary 
importance. Like his contemporary, Kant, who was also, though in a 
different direction, influenced by Hume,9 Smith wanted to place 
limits on the legitimate field of action of reason, to find a space for 
instinct and religious belief. Perhaps the greatest overlap between 
Smith and his contemporaries lay in their application of the 
doctrine of natural law. This is the topic of the next subsection. 
 
6. “Nature” and the Natural in Smith 
 
With Adam Smith and his disciples ... nature means the 
totality of impulses and instincts by which the individual 
members of society are animated; and their contention is 
that the best arrangements result from giving free play to 
those forces in the confidence that partial failure will be 
more than compensated by success elsewhere, and that the 
pursuit of his own interest by each will work out in the 
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greatest happiness of all (A. W. Benn cited in Hayek, 1949, p. 
12 note 15). 
The reader may have noticed the number of times, in the passages 
cited above, Smith uses the term “Nature” interchangeably with 
that of the Deity. Far from being the passive background or 
substrate of our activities, nature is seen as a direct manifestation of 
the deity, as an active principle intervening in our lives. These 
citations illustrate Smith’s adoption and adaptation of the archaic 
conception of natural law so popular amongst eighteenth century 
philosophers (Becker, 1932: Ch. II; Sabine, 1951: Ch. XXVIIff). 
 
The late eighteenth century French philosopher, Comte de Volney, 
defined natural law in eminently Smithian terms: 
What is natural law? It is the regular and constant order of 
facts by which God rules the universe; the order which his 
wisdom presents to the sense and reason of men, to serve 
them as an equal and common rule of conduct, and to guide 
them ... towards perfection and happiness (cited in Becker, 
1932, pp. 33, 45). 
Here again we see the universe as an orderly system administered 
by a god. The order implicit in it, which is presented to both the 
senses and the reason of humans, issues in both factual statements 
about the way the world is, and normative statements as to how 
people are to behave, so as to correspond with the divine will. Again 
the god is a utilitarian, maximising the happiness of mankind. 
 
Becker cites this definition as typical of the eighteenth century 
philosophers, among whom he explicitly includes Adam Smith 
(Becker, 1932, p. 33). His commentary certainly applies well to 
Smith: 
The language is familiar, but the idea, once we examine it 
critically, is as remote as that of Thomas Aquinas. Important 
if true, we say; but how comes it, we ask, that you are so 
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well acquainted with God and his purposes? Who told you ... 
that there is a regular and constant order of nature? ... 
Indeed it is all too simple. It assumes everything that most 
needs to be proved and begs every question we could think 
of asking (Becker, 1932, p. 45). 
I keep stressing the primacy of order in Smith, and the same is true 
of the philosophes: they wanted to be able to point to an ordered 
natural world in order to justify the conceptions of social order to 
which they variously subscribed: 
Most eighteenth-century minds were too accustomed to a 
stable society with fixed ranks, too habituated to an orderly 
code ... to be at all happy in a disordered universe. It seemed 
safer, therefore, ... to retain God ... as a ... guaranty that all 
was well in the most comfortable of common-sense worlds 
(Becker, 1932, pp. 49–50). 
 
And if a god did not exist, it would be necessary, as Voltaire 
(in)famously declared, to invent one. But a god in isolation, separate 
from the world, was not to the point. Their programme demanded 
that God directly reveal himself in nature: 
God had revealed his purpose to men in a ... simple and 
natural ... way, through his works. To be enlightened was to 
understand ... that it was ... in the great book of nature ... 
that the laws of God had been recorded. This is the new 
revelation ... This open book of nature was what Jean 
Jacques Rousseau and his philosophical colleagues went in 
search of when they wished to know what God had said to 
them. Nature and natural law – what magic these words held 
for the philosophical century! ... Hume, Voltaire, Rousseau, 
Volney: in each of them nature takes without question the 
position customarily reserved for the guest of honor. ... 
Search the writings of the new economists and you will find 
them demanding the abolition of artificial restrictions on 
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trade and industry in order that men may be free to follow 
the natural law of self-interest ... controversialists of every 
party unite in calling upon nature as the sovereign arbiter of 
all their quarrels (Becker, 1932, pp. 51–52). 
 
Perhaps we can best see the importance of this view of nature in 
the popular and scholarly response to a figure towering over the 
eighteenth century, that of Newton. During the course of the 
century, a large number of popular guides to Newton’s philosophy 
were published. The point of interest was not the technical detail 
but the overall philosophy, in particular Newton’s approach to the 
most fundamental of human problems – the relations between 
humanity, nature and God. Colin Maclaurin, Professor of 
Mathematics in the University of Edinburgh, set out the nature of 
these relationships in his own guidebook, An Account of Sir Isaac 
Newton’s Philosophical Discoveries, published in 1748: 
To describe the phenomena of nature, to explain their causes 
... and to enquire into the whole constitution of the universe, 
is the business of natural philosophy. ... But natural 
philosophy is subservient to purposes of a higher kind, and it 
is chiefly to be valued as it lays a sure foundation for natural 
religion and moral philosophy; by leading us, in a satisfactory 
manner, to the knowledge of the Author and Governor of 
the universe ... . 
 
We are from his works, to seek to know God, and not to 
pretend to mark out the scheme of his conduct, in nature, 
from the very deficient ideas we are able to form of that 
great mysterious Being. ...  
 
Our views of Nature, however imperfect, serve to represent 
to us, in the most sensible manner, that mighty power which 
prevails throughout ... and that wisdom which we see 
displayed in the exquisite structure and just motions of the 
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greatest and subtilest parts. These, with perfect goodness, by 
which they are evidently directed, constitute the supreme 
object of the speculations of a philosopher; who, while he 
contemplates and admires so excellent a system, cannot but 
be himself excited and animated to correspond with the 
general harmony of nature (Maclaurin, 1748, cited in Becker, 
1932, pp. 62–63). 
 
After citing this passage, Becker immediately adds: “The closing 
words of this passage may well be taken as a just expression of the 
prevailing state of mind about the middle of the eighteenth 
century. Obviously the disciples of the Newtonian philosophy had 
. . .  deified nature” (Becker, 1932, p. 63). 
 
The deification of nature led, as it was supposed to lead, to the 
sanctification of the particular model of human behaviour the 
philosophers wished to hold up as “natural.” The Declaration of 
Independence, for example, invokes “the laws of nature and of 
nature’s God” (cited in Becker, 1932, p. 52) to sanction its 
particular programme. Macfie, speaking of the “Scottish Tradition 
in Economic Thought,” says that “The main faith which the Law of 
Nature and Stoicism inspired in Scotland was a faith in natural liberty 
in a natural society” (Macfie, 1967, p. 26). In Smith we see frequent 
references to the “sacred laws of justice” (TMS II.ii.2.3), a “sacred 
regard to general rules” of morality (TMS III.5.2); “by the wisdom of 
Nature, the happiness of every innocent man is . . .  rendered holy, 
consecrated, and hedged round against the approach of every 
other man” (TMS II.iii.3.4). And in WN, we read that Britain’s trade 
policy with America, though in fact “not very hurtful to the 
colonies” was, in diverting trade from its spontaneous course, “a 
manifest violation of the most sacred rights of mankind” (WN 
IV.vii.b.44). 
 
For Smith, therefore, as was commonly the case in natural law 
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theorists, what is natural is god-given and therefore implicitly good. 
When Smith describes certain institutional arrangements in WN as 
“natural,” and others, on the contrary, as “artificial” (as, for 
example, in WN IV.ii.3), he is saying that the former are not just 
spontaneous, but spontaneous and therefore an expression of the 
will of God, whereas the latter must at the very least lie under the 
suspicion of sacrilege. There are many occasions where Smith 
invokes nature in this way in WN. For example: “All systems of 
preference or of restraint [of trade by the government] . . .  being . . .  
completely taken away, the obvious and simple system of natural 
liberty establishes itself of its own accord” (WN IV.ix.5). 
“[V]iolations of natural liberty [are] . . .  unjust” (WN IV.v.b.16). 
 
In his lectures as early as 1749 Smith was linking the ideas of an 
active, beneficent and rational nature – in short, a teleological 
nature – to the policy prescription of laissez-faire: “Projectors 
disturb nature in the course of her operations in human affairs, 
and it requires no more than to let her alone, and give her fair play 
in the pursuit of her ends that she may establish her own designs” 
(Smith, cited in Gay, 1969, p. 354). “To let alone” is, almost certainly, 
a conscious translation of the phrase “laisser faire,” which had been 
in use in France since the end of the previous century to denote 
freedom from government interference. 
 
But Smith extends the idea of what is natural to include human 
nature. What is instinct in us was implanted there by Nature, for a 
purpose – and this includes our weaknesses as well as our 
strengths. Thus, speaking of resentment and its issue in revenge, 
“the most detestable of all the passions,” he remarks that even 
here “Nature . . .  does not seem to have dealt so unkindly with us, 
as to have endowed us with any principle which is wholly and in 
every respect evil, or which, in no degree and in no direction, can 
be the proper object of praise and approbation” (TMS II.i.5.8). Thus 
resentment, like every other emotion, is divinely appointed, an 
endowment of “Nature,” but can become vicious when taken to an 
 40 
 
excess. This tactic, however logical in itself, involves Smith in 
inescapable contradictions once he attempts to derive his laissez-
faire policy prescription from it, as we shall see below. 
 
So Smith has a similar approach to nature and the natural as his 
contemporaries. If anything, however, Smith is even more archaic 
than his contemporaries. Prior to the eighteenth century, according 
to Becker, 
philosophers ... argued that, since God is goodness and 
reason, his creation must somehow be, even if not evidently 
so to finite minds, good and reasonable. Design in nature was 
thus derived a priori from the character which the Creator 
was assumed to have; and natural law, so far from being 
associated with the observed behaviour of physical 
phenomena, was no more than a conceptual universe above 
and outside the real one, a logical construction dwelling in the 
mind of God and dimly reflected in the minds of philosophers 
(Becker, 1932, p. 55). 
In the eighteenth century, however, – he cites Hume, in the 
person of Cleanthes in his Dialogues, as epitome – the logical 
process is reversed: 
Cleanthes does not conclude that nature must be rational 
because God is eternal reason; he concludes that God must 
be an engineer because nature is a machine (Becker, 1932, p. 
56). [T]he very foundation of the new philosophy was that the 
existence of God, if there was one, and his goodness, if 
goodness he could claim, must be inferred from the 
observable behaviour of the world. Following Newton, the 
Philosophers had all insisted on this to the point of pedantry 
(ibid, p. 67). 
Smith in this particular respect is out of step with his 
contemporaries. He clearly starts by deducing the nature of the 
world from a prior consideration of the “necessary” qualities of the 
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deity, and only afterwards claims to be able to support his 
conclusions by reference to observations of nature itself: 
The happiness of mankind, as well as of all other rational 
creatures, seems to have been the original purpose intended 
by the Author of nature, when he brought them into 
existence. No other end seems worthy of that supreme 
wisdom and divine benignity which we necessarily ascribe to 
him; and this opinion, which we are led to by the abstract 
consideration of his infinite perfections, is still more 
confirmed by the examination of the works of nature, which 
seem all intended to promote happiness, and to guard against 
misery (TMS III.5.7). 
There is no reason to believe that Smith would have seen any 
opposition between these two approaches – deductive vs. 
inductive, a priori vs. empirical – to the relation between God and 
nature. But he would certainly have rejected the latter as sole, or 
even major, support for his philosophy. Reason is “artificial” and 
fallible, and our finite minds do not perceive the remote 
ramifications of things. Things, as he stresses in Astronomy, often 
appear to us to be discordant and unconnected. This is precisely why 
we need a “soothing” scientific explanation of things, and God’s 
will, manifested in natural law, is the most pleasing general 
explanation available. So it would be a mistake to deduce God’s 
attributes from a finite and partial examination of nature: on the 
contrary, it is the assumption of God’s omnipotence, omniscience 
and benevolence which makes the discordant world of 
appearances at once comprehensible and safe. Smith in this 
respect is thus conservative even with respect to his 
contemporaries. 
 
Smith explicitly links the superiority of our natural feelings over the 
artificiality of reason, to the preservation of social order: 
That kings are the servants of the people, to be obeyed, 
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resisted, deposed, or punished, as the public conveniency 
may require, is the doctrine of reason and philosophy; but it 
is not the doctrine of Nature. Nature would teach us to 
submit to them for their own sake, to tremble and bow down 
before their exalted station ... (TMS: I.iii.2.3). 
 
The message is clear: the natural sentiments placed in us by a 
providential deity, expressed in established traditions, for example, 
of granting legitimacy to monarchs, are to be heeded in preference 




7. Smith’s Contradictions 
 
There are many logical inconsistencies in Smith’s theory, and I have 
noted some of them in passing. However, at base, there is one 
particular contradiction which confronts Smith, in various guises, at 
every turn. In his Weltanschauung, everything is predetermined for 
the maximisation of the “quantity of happiness” in the world at 
every instant. In empirical reality, there is obvious suffering and 
injustice. How is the latter to be reconciled with the administration 
of the machine of the universe by a beneficent, omniscient and 
omnipotent god? To quote Hume: “Epicurus’s old questions are yet 
unanswered. Is [God] willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he 
is impotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent. Is he 
both able and willing? Whence then is evil?” (cited in Becker, 1932, 
p. 68). 
 
Presumably even the most pious would concede that there must 
be logical restrictions on what a god can do. Can the deity create a 
weight so heavy that he cannot lift it? No: he is necessarily 
restricted to what is logically possible in what he can 
simultaneously achieve. It is far less obvious, however, that 
suffering in general, let alone any specific instance of suffering, is a 
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logical necessity for the achievement of God’s presumed aims, and, 
indeed, Smith makes no attempt to put the case. Instead, its 
necessity for the good of the “greater system” is simply asserted 
and assumed. This is not a subtle point and neither is it new: it was 
certainly as well known in Smith’s time as in ours that it was a 
problem for theories of this kind. He never addressed the issue, 
however, and failed to present any explicit theodicy going beyond 
these assumptions. 
 
Theodicy generally involves at some point an invocation of free 
will: God had to permit evil if he was to allow man free will and 
hence moral responsibility. Here again, Smith is on shaky ground, 
because he has made everything, including human nature, a part of 
nature; all behaviour, including human behaviour, is natural, and 
hence god-given. Our behaviour is prompted by the sentiments 
placed in our breast by “a wise providence.” Since we do what we are 
led to do, what we are predestined to do, choice is presumably an 
illusion. When we act, our hand is held and guided with parental 
concern by the deity. Our judgement of the moral quality of an 
action, as we have seen, is for Smith essentially a sentimental and 
aesthetic judgement without rational content. Arguably, it was 
open to Smith to adopt the compatibilist position of Chrysippus. But 
Smith carefully avoids addressing this issue, too, and the logic of his 
position, that we may admire “the wisdom of God even in the folly 
of man,” is surely that of determinism. 
 
The problem for Smith is this: if God is maximising happiness, he 
cannot at the same time permit either evil and suffering or free will. 
If he allows suffering, then the quantity of happiness is presumably 
not at its logically possible maximum; if he allows free will, then he 
is again not maximising happiness, as he is leaving that to the 
outcome of the considerations of errant finite minds. 
 
Finally, the further consequence of the view that everything in the 
world is part of the great machine, playing its part in God’s plan to 
 44 
 
maximise happiness, and that human nature and the behaviour to 
which man is led is a part of nature, is that regulation and state 
planning are just as natural and god-inspired as free trade and 
laissez-faire. Viner (1958, p. 233) asks, “was not government itself a 
part of the order of nature, and its activities as ‘natural’ as those of 
the individuals whom it governed?” As Becker says, 
 
if nature be the work of God, and man the product of nature, 
then all that man does and thinks, all that he has ever done 
or thought, must be natural, too, and in accord with the laws 
of nature and of nature’s god. Pascal had long since asked the 
fundamental question: ‘Why is custom not natural?’ Why, 
indeed! But if all is natural, then how could man and his 
customs ever be out of harmony with nature? (Becker, 1932, 
p. 66). 
 
The concept of the natural only means anything – other than 
fatalistic acquiescence to anything and everything – if it is 
contrasted with something else, something unnatural. This Smith 
attempts to do by referring to liberty as “natural” and regulation as 
“artificial” in WN, sentiment as “natural” and reason as “artificial” in 
TMS. But he cannot sustain this contrast on the basis of his theory. 
The category of the artificial has no meaning in a theory where the 
natural is already all- encompassing. This is clearly a critical 
contradiction for Smith’s espousal of laissez-faire, but again, he 
makes no attempt to address the issue. 
 
The contradiction can be seen particularly clearly in a paradoxical 
passage in TMS where he attempts, unsuccessfully, to reconcile his 
Panglossian view of the outcome of natural processes with the 
human attempt to remedy nature’s faults. But if natural outcomes 
are the best which are logically possible, then such faults are 
inconceivable. Smith says that “the general rules by which prosperity 
and adversity are distributed . . .  appear to be perfectly suited to the 
situation of mankind in this life, yet they are by no means suited to 
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some of our moral sentiments” (TMS III.5.9). In other words, God 
allocates prosperity by general rules which are designed to 
maximise human happiness, but the allocations which result, 
because of the finitude of human minds, do not always satisfy the 
moral sentiments which he has placed in us. 
 
Thus man is by Nature directed to correct, in some measure, 
that distribution of things which she herself would otherwise 
have made. The rules which for this purpose she prompts 
him to follow, are different from those which she herself 
follows ... The rules which she follows are fit for her; those 
which he follows for him: but both are calculated to promote 
the same great end, the order of the world, and the 
perfection and happiness of human nature (TMS III.5.9). 
 
So nature follows rules designed to maximise human happiness, 
and man, “correcting” this, does the same. The inconsistency could 
not be clearer. If nature’s rules lead to optimising, happiness-
maximising outcomes, then man’s correction of nature must 
interfere with this and lead to a suboptimal outcome; if, on the 
contrary, man’s correction of nature is happiness-maximising then 
nature’s rules must themselves have been suboptimal. Smith cannot 
have it both ways. Or, rather, there is one interpretation which 
would allow him to have it both ways. If he were to say that nature 
including humanity were designed to optimise, but that nature 
without man were incomplete, imperfect, suboptimal, which is 
more or less what Hegel says, then he could reconcile both 
accounts. Then human action to correct spontaneous market 
outcomes and redistribute prosperity according to merit would be 
optimising as it would be the result of both the rules of nature and 
the rules of man. 
 
To draw out the point, we may say that, while Smith’s version of 
natural law formed a foundation for the invisible hand mechanism, 
it by no means follows that it undermines the case for a visible hand 
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of state intervention. On the contrary, his Weltanschauung forms 
just as good a foundation for the latter as the former, and it is only 
Smith’s prejudices, and not his theoretical system, which lead him 
to prefer one to the other. State intervention is a product of all the 
human strengths and frailties of those involved in the political 
process. On Adam Smith’s account, those strengths and frailties are 
god-given and designed to lead individuals to act so as to maximise 
human happiness. There is nothing in the system of thought which 
Smith presents to say that the invisible hand active in the economic 
process will be inactive in the political process. 
 
Smith cannot have been unaware of these inconsistencies in his 
standpoint. Yet there is a sense in which he, himself, is not 
inconsistent in neglecting them. Someone who kept faith with the 
Enlightenment ideal of following Reason wherever it may lead – a 
Ricardo, for example, a Marx, a Darwin, or an Einstein – would have 
concentrated attention on these contradictions and drawn the 
logical consequences. But we have already seen that Smith was not 
in this mould. The late eighteenth century philosophers turned 
their back on reason and, instead, promoted sentiment. It was not 
Smith’s goal to present an intellectually unified, logically coherent 
system of thought, but to paint as pleasing as possible a picture of 
the world, such that the viewer would be “animated to correspond 




The question we started with was, how Smith saw the articulation 
between individual behaviour at the micro level and social 
outcomes at the macro level. The answer I have given in this paper 
is that the articulating mechanism consists in the agency of a deity. 
Our behaviours at the micro level are always just what is required 
for the optimal macro outcome because the deity’s invisible hands 
always lead us, through the pursuit of our own interests, our own 
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illusions and fears, and our own fellow feeling for others, to perform 
just those actions required to fulfil the divine plan. This is what 
Smith meant by the “invisible hand.” The implication is that invisible 
hand theorists of more recent times, such as Hayek, to the extent 
that, as representatives of a secular age, they cannot rely on an 
interventionist god, need an alternative mode of articulation 
between levels. The most frequently invoked alternative – to the 
extent that the problem is addressed at all – is some kind of 
evolutionary mechanism, but that lies beyond the scope of the 
present paper. 
 
I have also argued in this paper that Smith’s “invisible hand” 
mechanism is closely linked to the apologetic aspect in his political 
economy. While his confidence in a harmonious universe allowed 
him to make real scientific progress in political economy, without 
fear that it would destabilise the social order, Smith’s principal 
objective was, nevertheless, to reconcile humanity with the 
spontaneous social order and the status quo. He invoked the idea 
of a divine teleological plan, of the universe as a machine 
administered by a god, in order to explain away suffering and evil 
as only the proximate manifestations of chains of connection 
whose distant ramifications would include more than 
compensatory benefits. The idea is to convince us that we need do 
nothing at the macro level. All we should do is pursue our own 
individual interests at the micro level, and display appropriate 
levels of patriotism and respect for our leaders. The rich, the 
powerful and the fortunate all ensure that the big decisions of 
society are for the best – because they are taken by the hand and 
led by God to do so. All is for the best, then, in this, the best of all 
possible worlds. 
 
But does Smith not “protest too much?” Sometimes Smith’s 
protestations seem to invite the speculation that the truth is just 
the opposite of what he says. Smith claims that the universe is a 




But we know that this is not the case. The world is a jungle, an 
arena of clashing interests: “It is as though cheetahs had been 
designed by one deity and antelopes by a rival deity” (Dawkins, 
1995, p. 123). Smith claims that human nature and human society 
are a part of this organic unity, “all discord, harmony not 
understood.” But, of course, society was as riven by sectional 
interest then as it is now. His claim is to be understood, not as a 
positive statement of what is the case but as a normative 
statement of what is to be desired. He claims that spontaneous 
human institutions, “the result of human action but not human 
design,” such as the market, and the law, order and defence 
functions of the state, make an optimal contribution to human 
welfare because guided by the invisible hand of a beneficent, 
omnipotent and omniscient god. Again, we know of no reason even 
to suspect that any supernal agency exists, such that we can rely on 
its intervention to maximise social welfare.10 Again, perhaps, 
Smith’s claim is to be understood in a normative sense: what is 
required is a higher level human agency which will reconcile our 
differences and lead us through the pursuit of our own interests to 
the maximum achievable level of welfare: 
 
the invisible hand is only one of the many names given in the 
Moral Sentiments to the Deity great Author of Nature, 
Engineer, Great Architect, and so on. ... Adam Smith did 
believe (as a matter of faith) in this final reconciler. ... Now, 
there is little doubt that we today do not accept this kind of 
argument. ... The inevitable reaction is that, if the 
supernatural control is abandoned, human societies must 
supply their own. ... [T]he state ... must take the place of 









1. See Hegel (1952, paras 344, 348) for the best expression of 
the “cunning of reason” in Hegel, even though the term itself is 
not employed there. 
2. For Hegel, see the favourable comments on the political 
economy of Smith, Say and Ricardo in The Philosophy of Right 
(Hegel, 1952, para 189 and Addition); for Burke, see the long 
extracts from his review of TMS and letter to Smith of 1759 in 
Raphael and Macfie (1976, pp. 27–28). 
3. Eds 1–5 only. 
4. i.e., every capitalist. Smith naively adopts the standpoint of 
the individual capitalist and momentarily forgets that there exist 
other agents, who have no role in “directing . . .  industry.” It seems 
very ironic that the first of the two arguments for individual liberty 
which Smith gives here, is essentially a mercantilist argument: we 
do not need government intervention in foreign trade to give 
preference to domestic industry, because individual capitalists 
will be led by the invisible hand to prefer domestic industry 
without intervention. 
5. Smith even furnishes us with an account of why God is 
invisible (TMS III.2.31, Eds 3–5 only). If we could see him, Smith 
says, we would be so dazzled that we would be unable to go about 
our normal business. 
6. Much of this section relies on Becker (1932). Becker has been 
heavily criticised, notably in Peter Gay (“Carl Becker’s Heavenly 
City” (1957) reprinted in Gay, 1964, pp. 188–210). The points 
made in this section remain substantially untouched by Gay’s 
criticism, which boils down to little more than the complaint that 
Becker exaggerates. The same point could be made about Gay. 
Unfortunately, this is not the place for a thorough analysis of the 
problems raised by Gay’s very interesting discussion of Becker, of 
Smith (Gay, 1969, passim), or of the Philosophes’ “Revolt Against 
Rationalism” (Gay, 1969, pp. 187–207). 
7. The italicised concluding statement is the exact counterpart 
of Hegel’s assertion that “the real is the rational” (Knox in Hegel, 
1952, p. 10), and has exactly the same purpose, namely, to 




8. He includes in the term philosophes, amongst others, from 
France: Montesquieu, Voltaire, Volney, Diderot, Savigny and 
Rousseau; from Germany: Leibniz, Lessing, Herder and Goethe; 
from Britain: Locke, Hume, Ferguson and Adam Smith; and from 
America: Jefferson and Franklin (Becker, 1932, p. 33). 
9. See Kant (1950, 5 ff; or Academy edition, Vol IV, 258 ff). 
10. And, even if there were such a power, some might argue, 
passing up all responsibility to it for our own actions and their 
consequences in this fashion, might scarcely be the best method 
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